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 
Abstract—With the increasing demand for developing 
high-quality and more reliable systems, the process of 
developing trustworthy computer software is a challenging one. 
In this paper, we review various approaches to producing more 
secure systems. This includes established general principles for 
designing secure systems. It also provides an introduction to 
general software quality measurements including existing 
software security metrics. This paper also includes a comparison 
of the various security metrics for developing secure systems (i.e., 
architectural, design, and code-level metrics). Lastly, the paper 
examines the approach of refactoring, illustrates its objectives, 
and shows how refactoring is generally used for enhancing the 
quality of existing programs from the perspective of information 
security. At the end of this paper, we provide a discussion of 
these three approaches and how they can be used to provide 
guidance for future secure software development processes. 
 
Index Terms—Security design principles, object-orientation, 
security metrics, secure refactoring.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Much existing software is designed with poor 
consideration of information security which makes it 
vulnerable to many threats including malicious attacks [1]. 
Software patches are one of the suggested solutions for many 
of the security attacks facing software [1] but they are 
expensive to develop and deploy and do not solve basic 
design weaknesses in the program code. Another solution to 
achieve a secure product is by following a trustworthy 
security process [2]. Security processes, in general, consider 
many aspects of system design, coding, testing, and auditing 
[2] (e.g., international security standards such as the Common 
Criteria [3] or the Trusted Computer Criteria [4]). 
Another common approach for achieving a secure 
computer program is by following certain coding guidelines 
which focus on the level of individual program statements 
(e.g., to avoid/detect buffer overflows [5]). However, these 
solutions do not always work effectively and may, in general, 
even introduce new vulnerabilities to existing software [1]. 
Adding security features to systems after they have been 
developed and deployed has been a major cause of many 
system vulnerabilities [6]. Therefore, applying security 
principles from the early stages of the software development 
life cycle (SDLC) would be a better solution [1] and allow a 
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more coherent system to be produced [6]. 
Developing a secure system requires a good overall design 
which takes security into account from the beginning. A 
suggested methodology by Fernandez [1] incorporates 
security principles into each stage of the SDLC. It makes sure 
that each stage complies with these principles through testing 
cases. Another methodology by Eduardo and Xiaohong [7] 
called `security patterns' is used to improve the security of 
software based on existing knowledge of software attacks. 
These patterns aim to enforce security at the application level 
of a given program [7]. Preventing unauthorised access to 
sensitive data is the main goal of this approach [7]. 
Although these approaches can be a starting point for 
developing secure software, they do not provide an approach 
for quantifying the security of a given program or design. We 
therefore survey the current literature to show the best 
approach which can assist systems' designers to develop more 
secure systems from the point view of information flow of 
confidential data. In the following sections, we will review 
security design principles, software quality metrics and 
software refactoring principles relevant to achieving this goal 
in more detail. 
 
II. SOFTWARE SECURITY DESIGN PRINCIPLES 
To deliver a good software design, software design 
principles should be considered before the system is 
developed. They aim to provide guidance for software 
engineers to increase the assurance of software quality and 
therefore increase the software's security [8], [9]. Furthermore, 
the mechanisms that make a program secure should be self 
evident in its design. Bishop's [10] and McGraw's [11] texts 
are two recent examples of books that have identified several 
general principles which help to produce secure software. 
However, the work of Saltzer and Schroeder [12] in 1975 was 
one of the first on software security design principles. 
Security design principles can be described as concepts or 
guidance which can be followed to develop more secure 
systems at the software design stage. A fundamental design 
principle is that systems should be as simple as possible. 
Simplicity makes it easy to understand the system design and 
security mechanisms and decreases the chances for 
inconsistencies with the defined system policies [10].  It also 
reduces the interactions of system components which results 
in fewer security checks [10]. Security design principles must 
also enforce some form of restrictions, to reduce the power of 
a subject to get what is needed only and to communicate only 
when it is necessary [10]. Although, there are many defined 
design principles for developing secure systems, in this 
section we only concentrate on the ones commonly used to 
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achieve such goal. 
A. Principle of Secure the Weakest Link 
It is obvious that hackers will look for parts of the system 
which seem to be weak and are easy to break [11]. Therefore, 
this principle says that the weakest parts of the system are the 
ones which should be secured intensively. It is known that the 
system's weakest parts are often those which rely on human 
intervention by, for instance, administrators, users, and 
technical support staff [11]. From real examples a small mail 
server would be more likely to be a favourable target to many 
hackers to hack than a bank mail server (but also of less 
value).  
One way to secure those parts is to consider applying 
cryptography [11]. This would not make those parts 100% 
safe, but cryptography can be structured so as to require huge 
computational effort and knowledge to defeat [11]. 
Cryptography aims to minimise the „security perimeter‟ [8], 
which minimises what needs to be verified secure [8]. This 
leads to fewer security-critical functions which mean less 
exposure to threat. Memory corruption vulnerabilities can be 
described as a weak link of many software systems which, 
according to this principle, needs some extra protection. 
Buffer overflow is the most common such vulnerability and is 
considered to be "the single biggest software security threat" 
[11], [13]. 
Buffer overflow occurs when data is copied to a place in 
memory that is bigger than the reserved size [13]. Its threat 
arises from the fact that such a bug can have an effect on the 
system's data integrity [13]. Common examples of buffer 
overflows are stack overflows and heap overflows. It has been 
described as a design problem which occurs mostly when 
certain codes or functions are used [11]. It is more likely to be 
seen in languages such as C and C++ but is hardly seen in 
modern languages such as Java which provide bounds checks 
on arrays and pointer references [11]. 
Avoiding buffer overflows seems to be easy in theory but 
has proven hard in practice. One of the best ways to avoid 
such a threat is to avoid certain vulnerable functions and 
replace them with others that do the same job. In “Building 
Secure Software” Viega and McGraw [11] list most of the 
functions found to cause buffer overflows and the alternative 
functions which avoid it. Functions such as gets, strcpy, and 
strca, can be replaced with gets(buf,size,stdin), strncp, and 
strncat respectively [11].  
B. Principle of Least Privilege 
Bishop defines this principle as “a subject should be given 
only those privileges that it needs in order to complete its 
task” [10]. This principle not only relates to computer security 
but also to other security disciplines such as military security. 
An important principle in the military is declared as “the need 
to know” [12]. Bishop adds to this principle by stating that a 
subject should have only append rights when it needs to only 
append to the information already contained in an object [10]. 
This principle can be described as “programs and users 
should run with the least privilege to complete their job” [12]. 
The main advantage of adhering of this is that it can limit 
damage from implementation errors or attacks [12]. Another 
advantage is to minimize the interactions among privileged 
programs [12]. It is claimed that designing protection systems 
this way will help to identify where privileges and transitions 
should go and also where firewalls should be placed [12]. 
In real world systems, this principle rarely covers all the 
different aspects and features of the system. It is usually 
applied partially which means the risk of being exposed to 
threats still exists [10]. An example can be seen in the 
Windows and UNIX operating systems which do not apply 
access controls to the root user who is able to create, delete, 
read, and write any files. Consequently, a higher risk of 
compromising data and records exists [10]. 
Another principle similar to this is one defined as the 
principle of least authority (POLA). It suggests that objects 
having access to a certain component might not have that right 
for other components [14]. A capability based protection 
system is used to accomplish this by reducing the authority of 
objects [14]. 
C. Principle of Fail Safe Defaults 
Bishop defines this principle as “unless a subject is given 
explicit access to an object, it should be denied access to that 
object” [10]. Saltzer stated [12] that this principle was 
suggested by E. Glaser in 1965 so that access decisions are 
based on permission rather than on exclusion [12]. It also 
means that the default situation is lack of access and the 
protection mechanism scheme should identify conditions 
under which access is permitted [12]. Moreover, the reverse, 
in which the default situation is full access, is risky since it 
would be much harder to find errors and mistakes with a 
system that does not exclude users' rights [12]. However, 
designers using this principle should always follow a 
conservative design which is based on arguments for why 
objects should be accessible rather than why they should not 
be [12]. 
Moreover, Bishop adds that to be in a more secure 
environment, the subject should undo any changes it has made 
in the system security state before it terminates when it fails to 
complete its task [10]. For instance, the protection of a spool 
directory should be classified in two parts; one is to give 
create and write privileges to the mail server, and the other is 
to give only read and delete privilege to the local server [10]. 
However, if a mail server has failed to create a new folder in 
the spool directory then it should roll up its activities, and 
should not be allowed to extend its rights or place the new 
folder somewhere else in the directory. If such an action exists 
in the system then a hacker could take advantage of it either by 
overwriting other records or filling up other disks [10]. 
D. Principle of Economy of Mechanism 
Bishop defines this principle as “security mechanisms 
should be as simple as possible” [10]. This principle is 
important during the software design process due to the fact 
that unnecessary information or control flow paths could 
result from an overly complex design [12]. To make the 
design simple, known components of good quality should be 
reused in the system whenever possible [11]. To solve the 
problem of existing components of unknown quality, the 
system should be inspected carefully and there should be 
some sort of physical examination of hardware parts which 
implement the protection mechanism [12]. 
The refactoring approach can be a solution to make the 
problem of making a design and implementation easier to 
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prove safe. Refactoring is defined as “a change made to the 
internal structure of a program to make it easy to understand 
and cheap to modify without changing its observable 
behavior” [15]. To improve simplicity while ensuring security, 
the system should use a small number of “Choke Points” [11]. 
Those are used to force the users to follow a certain path along 
which security is improved [11]. 
E. Principle of Least Common Mechanism 
This principle is defined as a “mechanism used to access 
resources should not be shared” [10]. The principle claims 
that shared mechanisms provide an unnecessary information 
on control flow path between users. Such paths should be 
minimised to better secure the system [10]. However, if there 
is a mechanism that has to be shared between users then it has 
to satisfy the concerns of all of its users [12], for instance 
security concerns. It is also stated that shared functions should 
be run in users' interfaces rather than as a system procedure 
[12]. 
An example of this principle is sharing a website which 
offers electronic commerce services with all of the users. An 
attacker having access to such a website will flood it with 
messages till the website goes down. Customers will not be 
able to access the website at this stage which is a loss to the 
business [10]. 
F. Principle of Fail Securely 
Systems failures are not avoidable but security issues 
related to that failure can be avoided [11]. Some risks only 
occur when the system fails whereas if a system is normally 
working then no problems should be faced [11]. However, it 
is necessary to ensure that if a certain part of a system fails 
then it should fail securely [11].  
Barnum and Gegick have identified several strategies a 
system should follow after it fails to ensure a secure failure 
[16]: 
 Ensure secure defaults (i.e., deny access). 
 Undo all changes and restore to a secure state. 
 Always make sure to check values for failure. 
 A default case which performs the right thing in a 
conditional statement. 
It is necessary to verify how the system behaves after it fails 
and make sure that the failure does not harm the system [16]. 
A possible case is revealing sensitive information after a 
system fails which helps attackers to establish an attack [16]. 
Howard and LeBlanc verify that revealing unnecessary 
information about a system failure could help attackers [2]. 
The golden rule when failing securely is “to deny by default 
and allow only once you have verified the conditions to 
allow” [2]. The following example explains [16] the golden 
rule stated by Howard and LeBlanc [2]. 
The code in Fig. 1 shows a conditional statement that gives 
access to a user depending on the return value of variable 
dwRet. The code in the bottom half of Figure 1 can work 
perfectly but a problem will occur if method 
IsAccessAllowed, which decides whether to give access 
or not, fails for a reason such as \sloppy “ERROR NOT 
ENOUGH MEMOR”' [16]. In this case, the user will grant 
access because result dwRet is not equal to “ERROR 
ACCESS DENIED” [16]. On the other hand, the first code 
fragment in Fig. 1 shows that if method  
IsAccessAllowed fails for any reason, no access would 
be granted [16]. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Faile securely example. 
 
G. Principle of Compartmentalize/Isolation 
This principle's main goal is minimising the amount of 
damage to a system [11]. To achieve this, it considers two 
aspects. One is breaking up the system into small sub systems 
[11]. The second is to isolate program code which has security 
privileges [11]. This principle, in general, is better than 
systems that use access control mechanisms that allow all 
types of access or none [11]. 
UNIX's privilege model represents a bad example of 
compartmentalization since it gives users an all or nothing 
access model [11]. If a UNIX user has root privilege then this 
user can do anything to the system even if this capability is not 
needed for the particular job at hand [11]. An example of this 
privilege model is that it is not possible to be bonded to port 
1024 on UNIX systems unless the user has root privilege [11]. 
Another similar principle is isolation. Isolation has been 
found useful in hardware security designs since its main goal 
is to enforce a partial isolation of domains [8]. This means 
that those isolated domains will interact only with those 
domains and environments allowed by the security policy [8]. 
To achieve such isolation, there are four suggested ways: 
temporally, physically, cryptographically, or logically [8]. 
H. Principle of Reduce the Size of the Attack Surface 
Howard [17] has identified several techniques to reduce the 
size of the attack surface of a given system. One is to reduce 
the amount of running code. This can be done by turning off 
some unnecessary features by deploying the 80/20 rule, which 
consists of eliminating those features not used by 80 percent 
of the system's users. Another of these techniques is to reduce 
access to entry points by untrusted users, which can be 
achieved by authenticating all users of certain entry points. 
Another technique is to reduce privileges to limit potential 
damage, i.e., to reduce the privileges under which certain 
functionalities and processes execute. Another technique aims 
to identify threat code/design paths. This is part of the threat 
modelling process which can be accomplished through UML 
or DFD diagrams. Tracing these paths is capable of 
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identifying the data an attacker can access. The last technique 
is to measure the attack surface. This should be done each 
time a system has faced a change to either its environment or 
its functionalities. If there is an increase in the size of the 
attack surface, then it is better to identify the reasons behind it 
and try to reduce the size. The best approach is to define the 
minimal attack surface early in development, and then 
measure it regularly during the system development life cycle. 
Howard [17] has also stated two approaches to measure the 
attack surface size. One is counting the number of resources 
that contribute to the attack surface such as functionalities and 
system channels. However, this is a misleading approach 
since it assumes that all the resources make the same 
contribution to the attack surface. The second is using a 
predefined metric that takes into account the resources 
contributing to the attack surface. Also, the metric should 
assess each resource damage potential-effort ratio, as in the 
approach of Manadhata et al. [18]–[20]. This approach 
calculates the sum of three resources and their damage 
potential-effort ratio: 1) the system's entry and exit point, 2) 
the system's channels (those used to connect to the system), 
and 3) the system's untrusted data items (those items which an 
entry or exit point has direct access to) [17]. 
 
III. SOFTWARE QUALITY MEASUREMENTS 
Several studies have developed metrics for quantifying 
software quality attributes of object-oriented applications 
such as reusability and functionality [21]–[26]. These metrics 
aim to measure a certain quality attribute or a set of attributes 
at various stages of a program's development life cycle.  
An early study conducted in 1989 by Morris [27] suggested 
a number of object-oriented metrics. This was followed by 
Chidamber and Kemerer's work [21], [22] which identified a 
metrics suite for object-oriented designs, including metrics 
for weighted methods per class, coupling, cohesion, and 
others. The influence of these metrics on finding software 
weaknesses at the design stage of a program was analysed by 
Subramanyam and Krishnan [28]. A recent work has 
validated the metrics suite developed by Chidamber and 
Kemerer on six Java open source programs for a number of 
object-oriented quality attributes including reusability, 
understandability, testability and maintainability [29]. 
Briand et al. [30] suggested a modification to the cohesion 
metric identified by Chidamber et al. which considered 
attributes that are not accessed by any other methods. In a 
later work, Briand et al. [31] defined a unified framework for 
measuring coupling in object-oriented programs.  
Bansiya [32] also identified another approach to measure 
software cohesion and complexity at the design stage of a 
program by analysing class's method's signatures. Bansiya 
and Davis later suggested an approach to improve Dormey's 
Quality Model for Object-Oriented Design (QMOOD) [33]. 
This approach aims to measure the quality of various 
object-oriented design attributes such as reusability, 
flexibility, and functionality. Even though this approach 
covers most design quality attributes, it does not consider 
security as one of these attributes. 
A. Software Security Metrics 
Many software quality attributes have been studied and 
measured, including maintainability, performance, reusability, 
and reliability [33]. Security, on the other hand, has received 
relatively little attention. A common approach which is used 
by many programmers to assess the security level of a given 
program is based on the identification of pre-existing 
vulnerabilities [2], [9], [34]–[38]. The National Vulnerability 
Database of the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology [39] classifies software vulnerabilities into eight 
different classes based on the cause of the vulnerability, 
namely Input Validation Error, Access Validation Error, 
Exceptional Condition Error Handling, Environmental Error, 
Race Condition Error, Configuration Error, Design Error and 
other errors which do not belong to any of the above 
classification.   
Another technique used by Maruyama [35] and Howard 
and LeBlanc [2] aims to assess the level of security of given 
program code. This technique classifies code as either secure 
or not secure. Secure codes are those that do not introduce 
vulnerabilities to the system and insecure codes are the 
opposite. However, this technique does not distinguish 
between programs that are partially secure or partially not. In 
addition, it does not quantify how secure the code is. 
Therefore, there is still a need to establish a metric-based 
software security model [40] to assess the level of security for 
a given program or object-oriented class. Furthermore, most 
previous security measurements which have been defined 
either assess security at the abstract system architecture level 
[18] or at the low level of individual code structures [41]. The 
following sections briefly describe previous work on software 
security metrics at various stages of the software development 
life cycle. 
Architecture Level Security Metrics: Measuring the 
security of the system's architecture is an important aspect of 
identifying the overall security of a given program. One of the 
studies in this field is by Antonino et al. [42] who define an 
evaluation technique for measuring the security of an existing 
service-oriented architecture. This evaluation technique is 
based on two types of metrics: severity and credibility. 
Severity relates to the value of tagged security artifacts while 
credibility is the probability of correctly assigning a tag to its 
relevant system component [42]. 
Further work in this area was conducted by Liu et al. who 
proposed a model called the “User System Interaction Effect 
(USIE)” [43]. The USIE model is responsible for providing a 
systematic approach to identify security defects from the 
architecture of a service-oriented system [43]. 
A recent approach for measuring security based on 
architecture is defined by Manadhata et al. [18] which 
measures security with regard to the attack surface size, as 
described above. The system's attack surface measurement is 
an indicator of the risk of attack [20]. It is based on the set of 
possible resources which an attacker could use to attack the 
system [20], including methods, data and channels [20]. A 
method is described by Manadhata et al. as a system entity 
which could send data (exit point) or receive data (entry point) 
[18]. Data in their approach is any entity which is visible in 
the current system such as files, cookies and database records 
[18]. They also define channels as system entities which can 
be used by an attacker to invoke the system's methods such as 
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sockets and pipes [20]. A smaller attack surface indicates a 
smaller number of potential attacks, and thus a more secure 
system. They use this metric to compare the attack surface 
size of different versions of two IMAP servers and two open 
source FTP demons [20]. 
Design Level Security Metrics: Measuring security at the 
design phase, based on typical design artifacts, has not been 
considered until recently even though such metrics could 
efficiently eliminate software security vulnerabilities before 
they reach the final product [44], [45]. Such metrics would 
also allow software developers to compare the security level 
of various alternative designs under consideration. 
A recent proposed framework by Chandra and Khan [46] 
aims to provide software developers with systematic guidance 
for developing and validating security design metrics. The 
framework is classified into a number of factors including the 
identification of security requirements, vulnerabilities, 
metrics, and the validation model [46]. 
Another work in this field was by Agrawal et al. [47] who 
defined a measurement of object-oriented class vulnerabilities. 
The measurement aims to count the number of vulnerable 
classes in a given design [47]. A vulnerable class is the one 
which has sensitive and confidential data members and 
methods [47]. In other work Argawal and Khan studied how 
inheritance can worsen the security of a given object-oriented 
design by extending vulnerable attributes to other classes [48]. 
They defined vulnerable attributes as those which provide 
entry points to confidential data, and their proportion in a 
design is calculated by dividing the number of vulnerable 
classes to the total number of classes in a hierarchy [48]. 
Recent studies conducted by Alshammari et al. [49, [50] 
had defined several security metrics for UML class designs, 
and described a tool for automatically evaluating such metrics 
[51]. These metrics aim to assess the potential flow of 
classified data by measuring the accessibility of such data 
based on the security design principles of “granting least 
privilege” [12], [10], and [40] and “reducing the size of the 
attack surface” [17], [20]. 
Code Level Security Metrics: Developing security metrics 
at the level of source code is another common approach for 
quantifying security of a given program. Chowdhury et al. [41] 
defined a number of security metrics that assess the security of 
a given program based on code inspections. These metrics 
consist of Stall Ratio, Coupling Corruption Propagation and 
Critical Element Ratio.  They define Stall Ratio as the number 
of lines of non progressive statements in a loop to the total 
number of lines in that loop [41]. Coupling Corruption 
Propagation measures the coupling between methods and 
their parameters, and is defined as the number of child 
methods which are invoked with their parent's method 
parameters [41]. The Critical Element Ratio is the ratio of the 
critical data elements in a given object to the total number of 
elements in that object [41]. They demonstrated the 
applicability of these metrics on two different Eclipse 
plug-ins, Java Pathfinder (JPF), and JDemo Launch. 
Another similar work has been conducted by Aggarwal et 
al. [52], who indicated that unhandled exceptions could cause 
potential vulnerabilities and thus a less secure program. Their 
metric is a ratio of the number of handled catch statements to 
the total number of possible catch statements in a given 
program [52].  
Alves-Foss and Barbosa [53] proposed another code level 
security metric called the Software Vulnerability Index (SVI).  
The metric depends on evaluating a number of factors such as 
system characteristics, potentially neglectful acts and 
potentially malevolent acts [53]. The metrics are a ratio 
between zero and one. Higher values of the SVI indicate a 
higher vulnerability level, and hence a less secure system 
[53]. 
A similar method to Alves-Foss and Barbosa's [53] is 
Alhazemi et al's. [54] code level security metric called 
Vulnerability Density (VD). This metric aims to predict the 
number of potential software vulnerabilities in a program by 
inspecting its code, and is calculated as the ratio of the number 
of vulnerabilities in a given program to the size of the program 
[54]. The authors validate their metric on five operating 
systems consisting of three successive versions of Windows 
and two versions of Red Hat Linux [54]. 
Another similar work has been conducted by Alshammari 
et al. [55] which described a number of security metrics for 
object-oriented programs which are measurable at the level of 
bytecode instructions. The main objective of this approach is 
to capture the exact behavior of a Java program in the Java 
Virtual Machine to give more accurate results. Such metrics 
will provide developers with a simple way of identifying and 
fixing security vulnerabilities which might occur from the 
perspective of information flow of security-critical data. 
B. Summary of Previous Security Metrics 
 It can be seen that most security metrics assess security at 
either a very high level (i.e., the abstract system's architecture) 
or at a fine level of granularity (i.e., with respect to individual 
program coding constructs). However, the most efficient 
approach for quantifying overall security of a given 
object-oriented program is one which defined based on the 
compositional properties of object-oriented programs (e.g., 
coupling and cohesion). It also needs to consider data flow 
analysis principles that trace potential information flow 
between high- and low-security system variables. Such 
security metrics need to be capable of measuring overall 
security of a given object-oriented program based on many of 
its compositional properties and information flow principles. 
 
IV. REFACTORING 
Refactoring is an important aspect of software evolution 
since it aims to increase the quality of software [56]. It is 
defined as “a change made to the internal structure of a 
program to make it easy to understand and cheap to modify 
without changing its observable behavior” [15]. There are two 
main requirements for refactoring that can be seen from this 
definition. The first is improving the program's quality. The 
second is ensuring that restructuring the program does not 
change its functional behaviour. There are two types of 
refactoring [56]: code refactoring, and design refactoring. 
Since refactoring steps may change a program or design's 
quality, including its security quality, refactoring is highly 
relevant to security metrics and can provide a way of 
validating their correctness. “Good” refactoring steps should 
be detectable by our security metrics. 
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Refactoring is similar in a way to performance optimisation 
since both do not change the functional behaviour of the 
program. However, performance optimisations often make 
the code harder to understand [15]. On the other hand, 
refactoring aims to make the code easier to understand but 
does not always enhance performance [15]. 
Using refactoring involves two main activities: 1) adding 
functions and 2) restructuring those functions [15]. Adding 
functions involves inserting new tasks without changing the 
existing code and testing those tasks to ensure that they are 
implemented correctly [15]. The second activity is to 
restructure the interactions between these new functions in a 
better way [15]. Refactoring can be done as many times as 
needed provided it fulfils its two requirements. It has been 
shown that the continuous process of refactoring is essential 
for both the applications and their developers [56]. Fowler 
[15] has listed 72 refactoring rules in detail. In addition, the 
refactoring web page includes more refactoring rules [57]. 
However, none of these mention the impact of refactoring on 
security. 
A. Refactoring and Security 
Refactoring is an important aspect of software evolution 
since it aims to increase the quality of software [56]. However, 
its impact on software security was hardly mentioned or 
studied until recently [35]. Maruyama and Tokoda [58] 
investigated how certain changes could affect the security 
characteristics of a given program with regard to access 
modifiers. Their work shows which refactoring rules could 
change a class's accessibility level and therefore may change 
its security level.  
Other work by Maruyama aims to improve the overall 
security of a given program's code by identifying its code 
vulnerabilities and defining a set of secure refactoring rules 
[35]. The author proposed four refactoring steps for Java 
source code which aim to protect the confidentiality of secret 
data in a given program. These rules consist of Introduce 
Immutable Field which declares fields as `final' if their value 
is only set once [35]. Another rule aims to protect the secrecy 
of confidential fields through the rule of Replace Reference 
with Copy [35]. The other rules include Prohibit Overriding 
which prevents sensitive methods from being overridden and 
Clear Sensitive Value Explicitly which allows us to delete 
sensitive data from the program's memory as early as possible 
[35]. 
Furthermore, Smith and Thober [59] have identified a 
refactoring approach for critical systems similar to the 
approach of Li and Zdancewic [60]. Both of these approaches 
aim to refactor a program's code into two modules; a 
high-security and a low-security one. Smith and Thober admit 
that this is a very challenging task as many real programs 
share others' libraries and code between them. Therefore, 
detecting which classes are high security and which ones are 
not is, in many cases, very difficult [59]. 
Another work in the area of secure refactoring is Hafiz's [61] 
which defines a number of secure transformation rules. These 
rules aim to refactor program code in order to change its 
functionality to prevent well-known kinds of security 
vulnerability such as buffer overruns, code injection attacks, 
lack of access control and poor isolation. However, this 
approach does not consider the potential flow of classified 
information within a given program but instead aims to avoid 
well-known coding errors. 
However, although many of these approaches claim to 
improve the security of a given program by removing existing 
vulnerabilities, they do not guarantee that new vulnerabilities 
will never be introduced. Additionally, they do not quantify 
the impact of changes on the overall security level of a given 
program, and they require full source code implementations 
of the programs, which is inevitably less efficient than finding 
problems at design time. 
There are a number of identified software metrics which 
can be used to detect software weaknesses which require 
refactoring, for example, Joshi and Joshi's approach [62] but 
these do not include security metrics. Existing refactoring 
rules will often have an impact on security for all programs. 
For example the Encapsulate Field refactoring rule by Fowler 
[15] may improve security by hiding fields which contain 
secret data from public access. Similarly, the refactoring rule 
of Encapsulate Class with Factory by Kerievsky [63] may 
hide classes which contain confidential data from public 
access. As a result of this, our security metrics are beneficial 
when identifying potential refactoring rules, selecting the rule 
(and parameters) to be applied, applying the rules, and 
assessing their effect. 
B. Significance of Security Metrics for Refactoring 
Given that refactoring may change program code's security 
level, security metrics are needed to show the impact of 
refactoring on a program's security. Such metrics will help in 
assessing the impact of existing refactoring rules on the 
security of programs in a number of ways. One way is that 
security design metrics will help in measuring how 
design-level refactoring rules may affect security. The other 
way is to assess the impact of code-level refactoring rules on 
security. These two approaches will help to define a set of 
security-aware refactoring rules for the design and code levels 
that guarantee to improve (or at least not worsen) security at 
these levels. 
 
V. DISCUSSION 
Our literature review has focused on three main parts 
concerned with software security. The first is related to 
software security design, the second has illustrated some of 
the existing work on software quality measurements including 
existing software security metrics, and the third has discussed 
refactoring and how it affects security. These can be used as 
guidance for future secure software development processes 
and as elements of secure systems architecture. Many of the 
studies in this area focus on security at the level of individual 
program coding constructs. These approaches, which are 
related to security, intended as either guidance to help 
develop more secure systems or measure the security of 
individual program statements. However, most of them are 
not capable of quantifying the security of a given program 
either from its design or code level. Furthermore, those ones 
cannot detect the change to security when programs are 
refactored. Thus, the most efficient and promising security 
metrics are those which objectively measure the security of 
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various programs from either the design or code levels. Such 
metrics are also be capable of assessing the impact of 
refactoring on a program's security from various levels, thus 
making the metrics useful during system design, coding and 
maintenance. 
Our previously defined metrics [49], [50], [55], and [64] 
differ from previous work as it focuses on the security of the 
overall program module structure. We had studied various 
areas related to the security of object-oriented systems (such 
as, architecture, design principles, and refactoring) in order to 
achieve the main goal helping introduce a good security 
design into an existing program. 
A major challenge for these metrics is how to validate the 
outcomes. A study conducted by Tempero [65] looked at over 
100 open source Java programs to see to what extent a given 
program declared non-private attributes but does not use them. 
The study found out that up to 87 programs have at least one 
class with public fields. The most surprising result was that it 
is very common for real applications to declare a non-private 
field and not use it later on [65]. This result is consistent with 
the author's previous studies concerned with to what extent 
software design decisions are not followed [66] and also 
consistent with another study which confirmed that many 
interfaces in programs are not implemented [67]. Having seen 
the value of such an empirical approach, it is necessary to 
analyse suits of open-source software to validate security 
metrics. 
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have reviewed the literature to describe 
the various approaches for developing secure systems. It has 
been shown that the most promising approaches for achieving 
such goal consist of security design principles, security 
quality metrics and secure refactoring. Furthermore, an 
approach which aims to define security metrics that takes into 
account security design principles from an early stage of 
development would be an efficient approach for measuring 
security. Such metrics will also assist in defining the 
refactoring rules which either increase or worsen security for 
any given program with regard to the potential flow of 
classified information. This will also provide guidance for 
designing and recognising secure systems. 
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